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Thoughts on the Theory and Practice of Speculative Markets
qua Event Predictors
One of the most interesting and potentially significant developments of the last thirty years of economics
and political economy has been the establishment of a viewpoint in which markets are seen as more than
simply a collection of social institutions and rules within which commodity exchanges occur. The usual,
cursory understanding of markets as non-discursive, non-deterministic phenomena governed by
inscrutable laws of supply-demand and displaying natural underlying human proclivities—expressed in
the prices fetched by the production of and exchange for things desired—is readily associated with
Smith’s economic and philosophical liberalism. Most versions of markets do not view them primarily as
making significant contributions to human self-understanding; rather, a market is just an important arena
in which a given human activity occurs. When economists, other social scientists, or philosophers do
view market functions and data reflexively, they generally view them as primarily static records of
previous activity, as providing knowledge only of states of affairs that have already occurred. This view
of markets as archives of human commodity production and exchange has been so influential that
institutional investors and publicly-traded corporations have enshrined as a truism for fund or share price
growth that “past performance is no indicator of future performance.”
In recent decades, however, there has been an increase in the number of economists, political
economists, philosophers, politicians, members of the defense industry and military, institutional
investors, and businesspeople who have come to view markets as conceptual tools, as technologies
for both understanding and manipulating events and entities of both micro- and macro-scope.1 This
expansion in the scope of the role of markets is most obvious in the explosion of speculative
markets (usually for derivatives), which within the last three decades have increasingly come to be
viewed as predictors2 of future events, the very market-knowledge of which potentially constitutes a
feedback-loop allowing conscious manipulation of both the speculative market(s) in question and
the underlying issues in which the speculative market’s derivatives (futures or options contracts, for
example) trade.
The task of this paper is to investigate the emergence, presuppositions, workings, and effects of
these speculative markets qua technologies. Following a philosophical and economic introduction,
and as a sort of case study, this paper will investigate this subject by analyzing a model speculative
market called the Policy Analysis Market (PAM), which was invented by DARPA as a market
mechanism introduced into the FutureMap portion of the TIA program.3 The point is to design and
use PAM as a speculative market that will predict events in the Middle East, especially terrorist
events, rather than simply providing back-data. The hypothesis of the paper is that PAM displays
multiple internal contradictions that render highly problematic its use as a method for predicting
terrorist events.
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I. Background
There are understandable philosophical reasons for the comparative novelty of viewing markets as a
technology, much less as a conceptual tool for predicting future events. The static relationship
between the analysis/analyzers of market information and that market information itself essentially
is implied in the notion of the market’s value for liberal economists and philosophers. That is to
say, in their framework the significant benefits of markets in competitive equilibrium—their
production-distribution advantages and general efficiency of allocation of scarce resources or capital
—are predicated on market activity determined by an aggregation of given, collective demand and
supply in a general context of self-interested competitive behavior. Inter-temporal equilibration of
market prices—the measure of value—emerges (rather than is imposed) in the process of market
price discovery; and from Adam Smith’s invisible hand to Hegel’s system of needs to Friedman’s
laissez-faire market fundamentalism it is well-enshrined in the philosophical and economics
literature as the basis by which individual activity (whether corporate, institutional, or otherwise,
and always satisfying all assumptions of competitive equilibrium), driven by self-interest qua profit-
motive, leads to an efficient outcome for the system as a whole. In this sense, markets are self-
organizing systems, insofar as their order is a function of price-taking market agents whose actions
are considered from a local perspective, but which have an effect on the global state of the system.
This indicates then, in part, that markets display a complexity4 that is daunting to attempts to
understand the relationship between local states of a market system and the global state of the
system. The very fact that human behavior is messy, not easily reducible to a set of algorithms or
solvable differential equations, traditionally is what both nominates markets—which are taken
simply to reflect that given messiness—as the most efficient method for producing and allocating
scarce commodities, and nominates economics as “the dismal science.” When one says markets are
complex, one is saying that their existence as a system is, from the viewpoint of information,
fundamentally unlike that of a deterministic mechanical system. This is because, with market
systems (which are generally non-linear, dynamic, and non-deterministic,5 thus giving rise to the
incredible formalism of academic economics), even an accurate description and analysis of one
moment or region of the system cannot readily (and perhaps at all) be extrapolated to a description
of the state of the entirety of the system, whether that be past, present or future. This explains why
the standard tools of economists, technical analysis of past stock prices and fundamental analysis of
business data, are primarily backward-looking.
In any event, the result of the acknowledgment that markets describe given, complex systems of
behavior indicates their disutility as a technology, which implies some sort of significantly extensive
factor of control and manipulation. In fact, the influence of liberal, neo-liberal, and neo-classical
market theory has produced a philosophical, and some would say ideological, aversion to even
considering extra-market control (although this is usually associated simply with an aversion to
regulation). Interventions into markets—attempts to steer them, control their effects—are then
viewed as impeding market function. The prevailing assumption is that market power, benefit, and
progress paradoxically derive from the fact that competitive equilibrium market system behavior
always exceeds whatever control or understanding is yoked to it. The view of French economist
Leon Walras is indicative: he formulated the idea of discrete markets as fictions in which ghostly
auctioneers ceaselessly function to equilibrate prices and clear the frictionless markets of neo-
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liberal, marginalist economics. The auctioneer is a ghost, a fiction, because he is the best we can do
to formulate the preternatural ability of the invisible hand.
In essence, complexity is linked to uncertainty,6 and insofar as markets display the former, they are
characterized by the latter, which makes them tenuous as a technology. This, however, is not to say
that the study or manipulation of partial states of a market system cannot provide useful information
about the whole. At any rate, the value of markets is seen in their ability to produce maximally
efficient results—the effects of what we would imagine rational design, manipulation, and
regulation to be—when that “intended” rationality is otherwise impossible (because of the
uncertainty of human behavior). Market rationality qua efficiency emerges from atomistic behavior
—which from the perspective of the totality of the system is self-adjusting—rather than is intended,
designed, and imposed.
To take a specific example, one can turn to Pigou’s statement on the self-adjusting equilibration of
the volume of employment in the labor market under classical conditions of laissez-faire. Pigou
asserts that the quantity of employment in the labor market is dependent on several factors7 : 1) the
rates of real wages insisted on by laborers, and 2) the demand function for labor. Given these
assumptions, he makes the following statement on the self-regulating nature of the labor market:
“With perfectly free competition among workpeople and labour perfectly mobile, the
nature of the relation [between the real wage-rates for which people stipulate and the
demand function for labor] will be very simple. There will always be at work a strong
tendency for wage-rates to be so related to demand that everybody is employed. Hence,
in stable conditions everyone will actually be employed. The implication is that such
unemployment as exists at any time is due wholly to the fact that changes in demand
conditions are continually taking place and that frictional resistances prevent the
appropriate wage adjustments from being made instantaneously.”8
Immediately one notes that Pigou’s set of assertions relies on the fundamental principle that a
commodity’s price, in this case that of labor, is regulated endogenously to the market system such
that that price is optimal. This optimality is reflected in the maximally efficient production of that
commodity. This is the meaning of the statement claiming full employment—the absence of
persistent, general, involuntary unemployment (i.e., a waste of resources). Additionally, ceteris
paribus the market is instantaneously self-adjusting to this equilibration point; any inter-temporal
maladjustment in the form of unemployment is the result of a defective, impossibly slow reacting
wage policy. In essence, the point is that the “market knows best” and full employment (rational,
efficient production and distribution of a commodity) is achieved because the market’s “knowledge”
comes about through the decentralized aggregation of a set of individual decisions based on partial
bits of particular information (possessed by the self-interested market agents) which could not
otherwise be quickly and accurately aggregated. This argument—which relies on the emergence of
market rationality from the self-interested, partial rationality of agents with particular bits of
knowledge that coalesce into a systemic knowledge—is central to laissez-faire opposition to labor
market regulation, for instance a minimum wage.
Not surprisingly, this argument finds its philosophical basis in the political economy of Adam
Smith, who theorized this market behavior on a far more general level in The Wealth of Nations. In
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fact, he provided an early extrapolation of this principle and made it one of the guiding threads for
his philosophical development of the elegance of markets. So, for instance, in discussing the
concepts of natural prices9 and atomistic effectual demand, which Keynes himself describes as the
“leading lady” in the capitalist drama, Smith argues that:
“the natural price, therefore, is, as it were, the central price, to which the prices of all
commodities are continually gravitating. Different accidents may keep them suspended a
good deal above it, and sometimes even force them down even somewhat below it. But
whatever may be the obstacles which hinder them from settling in this center of repose
and continuance, they are constantly tending towards it.”10
This is to say, Smith asserts that prices determined by markets seem to be guided to the appropriate
and “real” value of commodities. Many econometrically trained economists, using equations often
adapted from physics and chaos theory, currently are investigating this hypothesis. At any rate, this
thought summarizes much of the basic force attributed to markets. Insofar as market prices are
tending toward equilibrium, and toward the natural price or “actual” value of a commodity, markets
display a collective rationality about the value of scarce resources that is presumed to exceed that
which could be manifested by the information or knowledge of any individual market agent. Insofar
as one views markets as a component of economics, and economics as dealing with the allocation of
scarce resources, then in this schema markets are maximally efficient, i.e. rational, to the extent that
they discover the price (and hence underlying value) of those precious resources.
What lies behind the gravitation of market prices to “real” prices, actual objective value, is,
paradoxically, subjective and atomistic activity. Keynes writes of the economic advantages of this
in concluding his General Theory: “They are partly advantages of efficiency—the advantages of
decentralisation and of the play of self-interest. The advantage to efficiency of the decentralisation
of decisions and of individual responsibility is even greater, perhaps, than the nineteenth century
supposed.”11 The great hypothesis behind this theory of markets is that systemic rationality
(reflected in prices), systemic efficiency, is generated by or emerges from the reciprocal mediation
of the self-interested utility (profit) maximization of individuals. But, of course, although that
individual activity is “rational” to the extent that it self-interested, this individual maximization of
utility is generally thought of with respect to utility considered as the expression of subjective
preference, happiness, and/or pleasure, i.e. as the expression of what for or in those human agents is
arational.
In an ethical context, this set of propositions is the basis for a standard version of the utilitarian
argument for markets. The ethical analogy to the rationality maximization of markets is that markets
produce the most utility most efficiently, and since utility is the measure of utilitarian ethics,
markets are the most ethical economic form. Insofar as the system is most efficient, it produces the
most utility for the largest number. Another way of putting this is that a rising tide raises all boats.
What makes that argument so unique is that each boat is unconcerned with the tide for all, but in
their unconcern for the state of the whole (i.e. their self-interest) they maximize the benefits for that
whole. The analogy comes full circle in that one then argues, paradoxically, that the ethicality (in
this case, market produced general well-being) of the whole, of the system, is generated by the
ethics (self-interest) of the individual.
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Within a socio-political context, Hegel was influenced by this concept. His description of “civil
society” (i.e., essentially a market society) is therefore “a system of all around interdependence, so
that the subsistence and welfare of the individual and his rightful existence are interwoven with, and
grounded on, the subsistence, welfare, and rights of all.”12 The commonality underlying this
proposition and that of the above-mentioned narrower sense of efficient market behavior is the
dynamism that obtains between the relationship of the universal and the particular, the global state
of the system and the local. For Hegel, as a market society we generate a system that increases
productivity and efficiency for the whole (which is reflected in prices for commodities) by relying
on the effects of the aggregation of individual preferences (reflected in individual willingness to pay
for that commodity) for one item rather than another:
“In this dependence and reciprocity of… the satisfaction of needs, subjective selfishness
turns into a contribution towards the satisfaction of the needs of everyone else. By a
dialectical movement, the particular is mediated by the universal so that each individual,
in earning, producing, and enjoying on his own account, thereby earns and produces for
the enjoyment of others.”13
The basic idea here, in fact the entire efficacy of the market principle, rests on the dialectical
concept referred to by Hegel as “the cunning of reason.” For lack of a more precise term, this is a
concept informed by a quasi-expression of the idea of the effects of unintended consequences, of the
realization of the resolution of a conceptual reversal. In this case, that conceptual reversal is that
individual unconcern for the benefit of the whole is a necessary driving force behind the attainment
of maximal benefit for the whole. In order to take the aforementioned description of the concrete
assumptions of markets, and then abstract them, we can turn to Hegel again:
“The special interest of passion is thus inseparable from the actualization of the
universal; for the universal results from the particular and definite… It is the particular
which exhausts itself in the struggle and part of which is destroyed… But the universal
results precisely from this struggle… This may be called the cunning of Reason—that it
sets the passions to work for itself [my italics]…”14
This is the central notion behind the ethical, economic, and social arguments for the superiority of
free markets characterized by a principle of self-interest qua unintended universal-interest, a
principle that expresses itself in profit-seeking and utility maximization within the basic guidelines
of fair competition. The cunning of reason is a dialectical conceptual expression of the movement of
Pigou’s labor market, of Smith’s invisible hand qua equilibrating prices, and of Walras’s ghostly
auctioneer.
II. Changes in the Paradigm and the Rise of Markets as Decision Support Systems
It should be clear that a result of viewing the motor of market activity solely through the lens of the
cunning of reason is that acquiring knowledge about the state of a whole market system is both
theoretically and practically problematic. That is, because of the assumptions about market atomism
and emergent rationality, for traditional versions of liberal, neo-liberal and neo-classical market
theory it is very difficult to gain an instantaneous, comprehensive, bird’s-eye view of what a market
is communicating. As a column in the Business section of the New York Times recently put it,
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trying to game a market via analysis is like trying to drive forward while only looking in the rear-
view mirror. This explains the old economics joke: that economists have predicted ten of the last
three recessions, ten of the last three market bubbles, bear markets, bull markets, etc. If one cannot
grasp the tool, understand its essential nature, using it becomes difficult. The wager, essentially, is
that the market is “smarter” than any of its individual agents or analysts. This is called the “dumb-
agent” theory of market price discovery.
However, over the last several decades researchers in several disciplines have made a bet that under
certain circumstances the “dumbness” in the dumb-agent theory of market price discovery is not
problematic for producing market knowledge that can be used to predict future events and as a
decision support system. The primary feature of this viewpoint is that it combines the liberal, neo-
liberal and neo-classical assumption of market efficiency via the cunning of reason with the field of
information economics, an economics discipline that considers information as a commodity and as
capital. Information too is subject in many ways to market principles. This robust version of market
activity is based on a refined and updated version of the efficient market hypothesis. Rather simply,
the core of this hypothesis is that the primary way in which market prices are produced is the rapid
and accurate dissemination, production, distribution, and categorization of information. The basic
principle of the emergence of a “collective” rationality, of the cunning of reason, is in force here
insofar as there are assumed to be many investors out to maximize profit, but what distinguishes
this modern efficient market hypothesis from the more hamstrung, earlier versions is that technical
and fundamental analysis cannot decipher the correctness of an equilibration point of prices as well
as information driven prices can. Another way of putting this is that, when unchecked, information
is immediately contained in market prices.
For many reasons (there can be no technical analysis or fundamental analysis, backward-looking
analytical tools, for prices that don’t exist yet, etc.), this theory has had its most interesting trials
with respect to speculative markets like futures markets, where individual agents consistently are
required to measure the conditional, relative probabilities of future states of affairs (which are the
issues underlying the futures contracts).
One of the most famous of these predictive markets is the Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM). Its most
well-known contract is the Presidential Vote-Share Market, in which multitudes of individual
investing market agents follow their individual passions qua profit motive, and thus via the invisible
hand or Walras’s auctioneer simultaneously effect trading behavior that forms a market price.
Simply put, this market price discovery is created by market agents who, taking risks and in
competition with each other, buy and sell futures contracts whose underlying issues are the outcome
of the presidential election. The medium for traders to buy and sell contracts is an online, web-
based, real-time exchange run by the Business department of the University of Iowa. The traders’
activity aggregates into a constantly updated, real-time prediction for who will win the election.15
The designers of the IEM describe the motor of this particular market thusly:
“The Iowa Electronic Markets are designed specifically as prediction markets. IEM
markets are computerized, electronic, real-time exchanges where traders buy and sell
futures contracts with payoffs based on the outcomes of interest [who wins the election].
Because real money is used, traders are subject to monetary risks and returns that result
from their trading behavior.”16
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Less than a structural involvement with the underlying issue, here what drives the aggregated,
equilibrated market price for a given contract is primarily the information that each of the investors
has. In fact, I hasten to add here that, with respect to the market outcome, the assumption is that the
only meaningful involvement the market agent qua investor has in either the Vote-Share market or
the futures contracts’ underlying issue (the election itself) is (1) a set of partial bits of information
about who the winner will be and (2) profit motive, the fact that s/he risks actual money when
buying a contract.17 Presupposing standard market ethics (free competition, the preponderance of
price-taking market agents, etc.), these assumptions must be in place because: (a) the whole point is
that different market agents have different yet incomplete information (this is what is being
aggregated and organized); and (b) to assume significant involvement of a market agent in these
contracts’ underlying issue would be tantamount to insider trading.
What are the features of the function of the IEM? “First, the markets give continuously updated
dynamic forecasts. Second, through the price formation process, the markets aggregate information
across traders, solving what would otherwise be complex (at best) aggregation problems.”18 I have
already mentioned the meaning of the second point: that information driven futures markets are,
from an analytical perspective, superior to technical or fundamental analysis. The corollary to the
first point is a major advantage of these information markets: that alterations in market prices at a
given moment accurately indicate only the relevant, new alterations in information. Additionally, as
the market designers note, there is evidence that (3) these markets are unbiased and relatively
accurate because they (4), following standard efficient market theory such as is advanced by anti-
regulators like Friedman and Hayek, weed out market agents with bias or consistently unreliable
information.19
Why, one might ask, would someone be interested in what appears to be a sort of—admittedly eery
—market based parlor trick? If one is a strategist for a petroleum services corporation, or a trans-
national company specializing in building airplanes, or many other types of businesses, it is very
useful to know in advance whether Bush or Kerry wins the 2004 presidential election, as the
outcome will influence the future investment and direction in and of one’s business. As mentioned,
the IEM has consistently outperformed analysts and pundits in picking the election winner.20 During
recent decades there has been a natural growth of speculative futures markets for sundry
commodities, and it has not escaped the notice of many analysts and corporations that these futures
markets’ contract close-out prices for delivery of a commodity—say, oil from Saudia Arabia—seem
to have an uncanny ability to indicate future events. For example, Leigh, Wolfers and Zitzewitz
have shown that long prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq the price of petroleum futures
contracts had incorporated a war premium, thus indicating a high probability of attack and
instability in the region.21 So, for instance, for obvious reasons if one is a production strategist for a
car manufacturer considering increased production of hybrid automobiles, futures markets in this
case are no longer simply a reflection of past behavior, expectation, or information: they are a vital
conceptual tool for decision support.22
What is significant about the rise of futures markets is that they are uniquely suited to, from the
perspective of the entirety of the system, producing rational information. Just as for Pigou the
market—by a decentralized mechanism of aggregating individual bits of knowledge and information
—generates the system-wide “knowledge” of where optimally to produce and place employment, so
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these information markets produce knowledge and information as their commodity. These type of
markets have information as both their input and output.
III. The Policy Analysis Market
This background permits an analysis of an experimental speculative market for information, the
Policy Analysis Market (PAM), created by DARPA and introduced into its FutureMap portion of
the TIA program. 23 The hypothesis of this paper is that PAM is a mediated system insofar as the
relative stability of the system and its elements or moments exhibits an absence of synchronic
independent variability and the continual presence of a global-local diachronic feedback loop
securing the system’s organization; yet, this market system’s fundamental incapacity to perfectly
efficiently endogenously regulate its own behavior is implied within the system’s antagonistic,
dialectical operational conatus. The result is that PAM’s effectivity is pathological.
By tracing the contradictions internal to PAM, this paper will demonstrate several features
regarding PAM’s effectivity24 : 1) PAM’s conceptual basis is self-negating, and thus the
market/system does too little; 2) the desired rational efficiency is undercut by the properties of the
trading instruments, derivatives, whose profitability in part stems from “irrational” trading behavior
linked to derivatives; 3) this market system poses the significant probability of producing the
terrorism whose function it is to predict and prevent (i.e. it does too much).
PAM’s theoretical-functional system principles are a distillation of the structural features of the
dominant neo-classical theory of capitalist markets in general: rapid and accurate dissemination,
production, distribution, and categorization of information and commodities. But as the market
designers note, and like the IEM, “PAM is a combinatorial information market: a market in futures,
options, and derivatives that are based on eventualities rather than specific commerce. PAM will
trade contracts on one year maturity, issued quarterly, that span economic, civil and military
conditions” in the Middle East.25 Like the IEM, traders purchase the contracts online using a fully
electronic, computerized, point-and-click, Java applet-based trading interface platform.
A refined market technique focusing and collating information for “decision support”26 and analysis
toward event prediction, PAM’s precedent as a technology is found in the recent phenomenon of
private and public sector analysts employing derivatives and commodities market prices (for oil,
currencies, national debt, interest rates, etc.) in estimations of event probabilities.27 For a given
derivative contract, if a PAM trader considers it as under-pricing (under-predicting) the future status
of the issue by which it is conditioned, then his contract purchase (for profit “going long”) would be
aggregated with others (who may, to the converse, be [“short”] sellers of the same contract type,
indicating over-prediction) into a price fluctuation forming a “signal” indicating the future
probability of the underlying issue.
Because PAM is a combinatorial market, this market discovery process assumes hedges,
“conditional beliefs.”28 That is, derivatives may describe linked events such as U.S. equity and
military disposition in a given country. The PAM listed futures and options derivatives allow
traders with knowledge of a specific “sector” to construct profitable combinations of contracts, thus
permitting PAM to achieve high predictive resolution via conditional probabilities.29 For example, a
specialist on Jordan might have information on Jordan’s political stability “given the duration of
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Iraqi resistance to U.S. military policy. This expert can hold this insight without any special
knowledge about the conduct of U.S. military policy. This amounts… to a hedge30 ; ‘Given that B
happens, I believe that there is an X% chance of A happening.’”31,32 From the perspective of the
analyst employing this market data, the goal is to build probability profiles terminating in the future
status of a derivative’s underlying issue or event.
PAM’s original design33 offered three types of futures and options contracts: 1) Regional securities
based on data indices for economic health, civil stability, military disposition, and U.S. economic
and military involvement in the major countries of the Middle East34 ; 2) Global securities on “U.S.
equities, U.S. GDP, global trade, deaths from terrorism, and U.S. military deaths”35 ; 3) Special
Event securities on one-off, verifiable occurrences (for example, an assassination or a coup d’etat in
Jordan).
The theory on which PAM is founded is as old as Thales,36 or at least as old as Hegel’s or Smith’s
description of markets as the cunning of reason, the invisible hand, the eighth wonder of the world.
PAM’s power relies on the theory of efficient market discovery via rapid, capillary, and accurate
distribution of information. Said differently, and analogous to emergent phenomena, PAM posits
the market’s securities values as containing more information, as providing a more “intelligent,”
accurate, and extractable signal (measured in fluctuating contract prices), than any of its individual
agents. There is interesting empirical evidence for this.
For example, Maloney and Mulherin find compelling precedent in the market’s reaction to the
Challenger disaster. Although NASA’s expert committee needed months to find the cause of this
widely observed event, comparative share prices for each of the four main shuttle contractors
immediately determined the manufacturer responsible. Ruling out insider trading, Morton Thiokol,
manufacturer of the faulty O-Rings, quickly was punished with a nearly 12% loss in share price.37
Other shuttle contractors remained relatively free of market punishment.
PAM’s conceptual requirements, however, show distinctive contradictions resulting in an
antagonistic phenomenology. The system does both too little and too much. This is clearly evident
with regard to PAM’s centerpiece: terrorism/violence futures and options contracts.
Derivatives contracts offered for terrorist events in the Middle East were designed to predict them.
A rapid rise in the value of a futures contract for a terrorist event (say in one month) in a friendly
country would serve as a market signal for an equal38 rise in the probability of that event (investors
think the event is likely, and thus buy the associated contracts, driving their price up and giving
security analysts dynamic market discovery information). This would trigger a response to stop the
event, drastically reducing the event’s probability, and thus the condition of the possibility of a
profitable value for the linked derivative contract. But a market’s supply-demand logic cannot
tolerate the act of a securities purchase contributing to that act’s unprofitability.39 The value of the
associated terrorist future would not in fact show the rapid rise necessary to produce the “signal,” as
to do so would lead precisely to the prevention of the event that must take place for the terrorist
future to mature (a requirement for the contract to be realizable and profitable). The idea that
government authorities employ the market to foresee events that they will prevent would, a priori,
mute the signal. The system does too little.
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This conceptual incoherence is present as the reflection of another internal, determinate negation.
As just explained, a derivatives trader would not purchase a terrorist future because the very act of
buying the contract would undermine the contract’s value. What appears there as the paradox of the
trader who, from the perspective of the future anterior, will not have bought anything is in fact the
reflective determination of an inconsistency implicit in a moment conceptually prior: here, the
derivatives of maximal predictive interest, the impetus for the system’s design, terrorism
derivatives, must be explicitly articulated in order to be offered. But if the market designers can list
a specific terrorist event, then they have always already defined, determined, and predicted the very
event that the market is designed to identify. If the market designers know which terrorist
derivatives to offer, then they have already done the work of the market. Again, the system is
inadequate to its concept. It contains within itself the unraveling of its own conditions of
possibility.
Like all capitalist market systems, and indeed like all systems per se, PAM displays “friction,”
internal inconsistencies and antagonisms, despite its claim to ideality. This is actually expected,
insofar as markets 1) are incredibly complex phenomena of rules and regulations, 2) produce
markets within markets (internal competition) and links to other markets, and 3) are inherently
unstable by virtue of their organizing principle (competition requiring growth, asset dominance,
economies of scale, oligopolies, etc.).40 Were PAM to be employed it would doubtless display these
characteristics. In the case of PAM, this friction is structural insofar as it manifests as the internal,
related contradictions of the first two moments of the system. Moreover, PAM’s first two moments
present themselves in a logically inverse manner,41 but one fully consistent with Hegel’s constant
and counter-intuitive insistence on dialectical reversal. At least with respect to this policy analysis
market the dialectical mechanics that produce the cunning of reason in markets in general produces
a problematic dialectic. What appears as moment1, the failure to produce a signal at all, is in fact
the consequent, moment2, the reflective determination of that failure’s implicit ground, the actual
moment1 (the logical absurdity of defining a terrorist future, which is then to be speculated on in
order to be determined). Formally, this is precisely the structural logic of the relative positions of
the moments of Hegel’s category analysis.42 The first negation43 (that of the failure, within the
market system as given, to produce a signal) is itself negated by its implicit antecedent (the
market’s contract listing presupposes its object, and thus nullifies itself): thus the negation of the
negation is the positing of the system’s a priori failure, manifesting (in the mode of the future
anterior) as a failure within the system.
Transitioning via the aforementioned moments of negation, PAM’s immanent logical contradictions
manifest themselves on a plane of surplus materiality. Unsurprisingly, because they are the mutually
constitutive interface of subject and object, integral moments of the market system’s “co-opetition,”
the movement from concept to materiality in PAM passes through the contradictory nature of the
internal relation between the tradable instrument, the derivative, and the market efficiency that
forms the basis for the market’s price (“information”) rationality and accuracy. Derivatives in
general function to hedge risk and provide the possibility for quick, temporarily high profit yields.
This second, vital feature, called “gearing,” is key to derivatives because of their acute time
sensitivity vis-à-vis their issue of interest. Within the economy of the system, gearing is a moment
of explicitly articulated irrationality (an over-pricing which neo-classical economics argues dampens
out over time44 ).
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Indeed, Nobel laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz argues that markets in general and speculative
markets in particular are often inefficient in the short-run; but it is precisely short-run, time
sensitive contracts (for terrorism, assassinations) that are of interest as signal providers to PAM.
Stiglitz contends that price oscillations are very often governed not by new information rationally
incorporated into a share or contract price, but rather by herding, an “irrational” and/or “emotional”
investment behavior. This aspect of market psychology is a driving force in speculative markets like
those for derivatives—in fact, it is the key determinant for price discovery in speculative markets.
Keynes warned of this predominance of irrational speculative market herding behavior in his
General Theory, and was one of the first to point out that the motor for this comes about because
derivatives traders are less interested in the state of the value of the fundamentals underlying a
derivative than they are “interested in discovering what opinion believes average opinion to be; and
this… weakness finds its nemesis in the stock market.”45 That is to say, speculative markets like
those for futures discover price as much by rumor as by sound thinking, and this makes them
volatile and often inaccurate. There is no reason to think that this behavior will not be predominate
in PAM, and this is damaging to PAM because of its reliance on the operational rationality of
efficient (both responsive and accurate) market discovery.
Interestingly, this aspect of market inefficiency is illustrated by the 2002 Columbia shuttle disaster.
In the period between Challenger and Columbia, Morton Thiokol, the manufacturer responsible for
Challenger’s explosion, was purchased by Alliant Techsystems Inc. Apparently suffering a
flashback to 1986, upon news of Columbia’s re-entry explosion the market punished Alliant
Techsystems with a share price loss of nearly 12%, almost exactly the market punishment meted
out to Morton Thiokol in 1986. After Columbia, the other main shuttle contractors, Boeing and
Lockheed Martin, were punished only 1.5% and 3% respectively.46 So far, however, it seems that
Columbia’s crash was due to a manufacturer failure by Lockheed Martin, not Alliant. With regard
to this market failure qua misidentification, economist Daniel Gross comments that “the market
may be efficient[,] [b]ut it can also emotional. Did traders with long memories rush to sell Alliant
disproportionately because Morton Thiokol was deemed responsible for the Challenger disaster?
Almost certainly.”47
Although as an argument for short-run market inefficiency the shuttle case is merely anecdotal, it is
the case that a primary desideratum of derivatives is the possibility for short-term irrationality built
into their very nature. As demonstrated, however, static contract values contain no information;
only a PAM contract’s price changes are communicative, produce market discovery. The very
property that makes derivatives desirable, gearing, makes them irrational, inefficient, and wildly
unstable as a material instrument linked to terrorism prediction.48 This flaw is systemic with regard
to PAM’s operational requirements, which are predicated on the ability of a contract to shoot up in
value. Previously this moment was analyzed as self-negating, as containing its own contradiction
within itself. That analysis of inadequacy qua lack (failure of PAM to get off the ground) finds
here, in the nature of its chosen instruments, a transitional point to an irrational, inadequate moment
of excessive production. As is evident, PAM also does more than is intended.
Indeed, in the final analysis PAM’s concept, ostensibly predicting and preventing terrorism,
displays the dialectical tendency to produce its opposite. PAM’s harnessing of cold profit logic
actually generates a stimulus for purchasing a terrorism contract—linked say to an attack, using an
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/richey.html[9/18/2009 5:09:32 PM]
explosive laden furniture truck or donkey, against a cafe or police station—and then taking
measures to ensure the occurrence of the underlying issue. This is not simply a problem of insider
trading, of illegality that no market in the history of humanity has ever managed to eradicate.49
Rather, this effect is internal to the system’s logic. This is absolutely clear when one recalls the
philosophical principle underlying the relationship between individual market agents and the market
as a whole: the element that drives the aggregation and conversion of individually held information
into dynamic market price discovery is self-interest qua profit maximization. In this case, a likely
source of profit maximization—and an entirely rational act from the philosophical viewpoint that
judges individual utility as the supreme driving force behind collective interest—would be to
purchase contracts and then work to ensure that they pay off. Moreover, depending on PAM’s
design, one can argue that influential government analysts, agencies, and/or policymakers could
wield significant power to create a market of self-fulfilling prophecies for regime changes and
terrorism in the Middle East. PAM reaches its apotheosis at the moment it raises the significant
possibility of generating the terrorism it is designed to hinder. Embedded within PAM’s normal
effective register is an antagonism manifesting itself as a surplus production, a materiality
paradoxically both within and without the system’s functional requirements.
IV. Reflections and Considerations
The birth of PAM is noteworthy for several reasons. 1) From a historical perspective, it marks an
extension of the standard understanding of the scope of markets as a technology. 2) From a
philosophical perspective, it is an interesting application of ethereal philosophical principles—the
invisible hand, the cunning of reason, self-interest—to a technology that hybridizes modern
electronics and market concepts in order to take on a tangible problem. Further, PAM’s internal
contradictions and flawed logic are grist for a dialectician’s mill. What is also significant is the fact
that PAM, in functioning as a sort of distillation or concentration of a certain set of philosophical
and economic assumptions about what markets in general can do, provides a sort of isolated model
or test case for viewing the validity of those assumptions, particularly those philosophical and
economic assumptions about the smooth, self-regulating nature of the market mechanism. 3) From
an ethical perspective, PAM presents a set of new, difficult issues.
Naturally PAM and its related issues are a rich mine of ideas, and I cannot deal with them all.
Instead I will sketch out briefly the terrain for a deeper investigation into the considerations
mentioned above. I will deal with these topics in reverse order, as it seems that one cannot begin to
understand the historical shift without understanding the ethical and philosophical points.
3) A question of ethics: Most obvious, of course, is an ethical issue that is also a functionality issue:
the easily intuited ethical breach that would come in the form of an investor committing a terrorist
act in order for his/her contract purchase to pay off is additionally a clear failure with respect to the
system’s design. For many people, of course, this circumstance would in fact be the primary failure,
with the ethical problem playing an obvious second fiddle. Furthermore, it is odious to contemplate
the functional and ethical failure that would occur if a terrorist entity or some quasi-legitimate front
organization (say, an Islamic charity) were able to create a self-fulfilling prophecy and finance
future terrorist activities by profiting off the first. Presumably this could be controlled by advanced
screening of traders, but I have seen no evidence that this issue has been addressed by PAM’s
designers. At any event, this is a real concern and by no means an easily preventable one.
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Moreover, this screening process also would be unable to address the functional and ethical problem
that would arise through government agencies creating self-fulfilling prophecies of terrorist events.50
Yet even if these problems were solved, there are deeper ethical issues. Not least of which is that
regarding the admittedly ghoulish concept of a non-terrorist investor turning a profit because of a
terrorist event. This would be a very new meaning of a very nasty word and old occupation: war-
profiteering. In essence, terrorist markets are markets trading in death and chaos: of U.S.
servicemen/women, of leaders of state, of civilian populations. Now, over and above the fact that,
via market principles alone, I have shown that PAM cannot work, and in fact likely would (even
assuming away its logical flaws) produce the terrorism it is designed to hinder—that is, even if
PAM were to have the possibility of working, would its principle and payout structure pass an
ethical test? For lack of a more philosophical term, I call this ethical test the “eeww” test. In the
absence of formalized ethical principles about a given situation, the “eeww” test stipulates that if the
object of moral inquiry causes one an uneasy, uncomfortable reaction, then that object likely has
some ethical problem embedded in it.
The test is actually fairly standard as an argument advanced by ethical intuitionists. Many
philosophers and most non-philosophers apply this test often, particularly when there are no easily
identifiable ethical rules or principles for a given state of affairs. This test is comparatively
conservative, and is often used as the bulwark of slippery slope arguments against changes in social
patterns of behavior and advancements in technology and invention. The U.S. Supreme Court, for
example, repeatedly has used the “eeww” test to distinguish between pornography and legitimate
free speech protected by the 1st Amendment. In illustrating the difficulty of pronouncing legal,
much less moral, judgments about issues with tremendous gray areas, one justice famously said of
pornography: I don’t know what pornography is, but I know it when I see it. Many people, and in
the EU particularly, apply this ethical test to the new technological issues surrounding the value of
genetically modified crops. Recent significant technological progress in gene therapy, stem-cell
research, and artificial intelligence often has outstripped the ability of formalized moral judgment to
assess the moral ramifications of each, thus forcing many into the situation of applying the “eeww”
test.
Because much of the world is struggling to establish a set of ethical guidelines for counter-terrorism
activities, this test is particularly apt with respect to the particular methods of dealing with
terrorism. This certainly is the case in the U.S., where post-9/11 trauma and the abuse of detainees
in Iraq and Afghanistan have led recently to a serious public debate about the acceptability of
torture as a tactic for gathering intelligence about potential terrorist acts. By and large, the moral
content of much of this debate has focused on which side of the “eeww” test one falls. A similar
question must be posed with respect to PAM. Is it the case that a market system based on profit by
death and chaos is too odious?
The historical answer to this question may well be yes. As it so happens, PAM was cancelled by
DARPA in 2003 after Congressional, media, and popular moral outrage about the ghoulish nature
of war-profiteering via so-called “death markets,” the contracts that specifically traded in terrorist
events, assassinations, and U.S. military service deaths.51 Clearly this iteration of PAM failed the
“eeww” test. The question is why, although I do not have space to answer here. I might simply say
that the intuitive moral response that many had to PAM may well tell us something about our larger
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ethical concerns vis-à-vis technological progress and the changing landscape of a post 9/11 world.
At any rate, PAM is at the very least an example of how an alteration in human technological
power can be reflexive, can provide us with information about values, priorities, and self-
understanding.
2) Some general philosophical questions: Although the initial version of PAM was cancelled, a
second version was scheduled to go online in March 2004 (although the larger project in which it
was embedded, the TIA program, remains shelved). According to the PAM website, although the
point is still to predict terrorist acts, the new PAM does not trade in derivatives contracts for
terrorist acts or violent events, and PAM is no longer housed in any U.S. government agency.52
Perhaps this marks the recognition of the ethical problems elucidated above, although it is more
likely that the changes reflect the functional problems elaborated in the body of this analysis. In any
event, PAM still exists as a decision support system employing the philosophical principles behind
efficient market theory, and in this case that theory is now applied to information gleaned from
derivatives contracts for market prices of petroleum, U.S. equity in the M.E., trade, investment,
etc.53
Because in this iteration the derivatives contracts being traded are not also the contracts whose
underlying conditioning issue is being prevented from occurring, and because there are no terrorist
contracts traded whose listing on the borse is paradoxically the condition of possibility of the
contract not needing to be listed, and because the contracts are not directly predicated on payouts
related to terrorist and violent events, PAM’s designers have solved three of the flaws I identified as
manifesting a dialectical inter-relation of sublation, where each contradictory moment of PAM
represented the implicit truth of the contradiction of a logically prior moment. In any event, the
alterations make PAM a functional concept, even if it does not actually help hinder terrorism.
Nonetheless, it is not a slam dunk that the new version of PAM is ethically or philosophically
sound.
On an ethical level, it does not seem clear that any philosophically rigorous argument could
definitively state that the fact of a mere indirect relation of profit to terrorism makes a trader’s
participation morally unsullied. Traders will still be profiting off of derivatives contracts whose
underlying issues are related to fundamental causes of terrorism: wildly fluctuating petroleum and
currency market prices in places like Saudi Arabia or Egypt or Iraq (states where petroleum prices
have abnormally significant impacts on political (in)stability, which is directly correlated with
terrorism), U.S. military presence in various M.E. countries (which has been a stated reason for Al-
Qaeda attacks), (low) GDP growth in the M.E., M.E. capital flight that exacerbates poverty, etc. In
essence, it is worth asking whether or not there is something inherently predatory in this model,
even after the removal of the trading of terrorism contracts.
This issue is related to another: whether or not, despite the changes to PAM, it is the case that the
contradictions—particularly those regarding the production of the terrorism which is to be prevented
—which are inherent in the first PAM model are still present implicitly in the second version. After
all, the market principle is based on the notion of contradiction: that one achieves order through
chaos, benefit for all through caring only about self-interest, the cunning of reason. Given this, it
would seem likely that the new version of PAM would also have a tendency for self-fulfilling
prophecies, especially since futures markets in general are notorious for this type of result. Keynes
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argues precisely this point, and rests his argument on a principle of uncertainty that is common to
all markets. Here is Martin Weitzman’s brief synopsis of Keynes on this point about markets:
“[Uncertainty] is essentially due to insufficient or precarious knowledge of the
mechanism by which the future is generated out of the past… Expectations play an
important dual role as both a manifestation of uncertainty and a cause of it [my italics].
Such expectations are arbitrary to some degree because they can be based on almost
anything, including self-fulfilling expectations of the behavior and expectations of others.
And, as Keynes pointed out, ‘being based on so flimsy a foundation, these expectations
of expectations are subject to sudden and violent changes’.”54
Why should one be surprised if the revised PAM displays a result that is the direct opposite of what
intuition would dictate? Might it be the case that the catastrophic and contradictory irony of the first
version of PAM, that it would produce the terrorism it was designed to hinder, is a manifestation of
the deeper role of contradiction in markets in general? And thus might it be the case that this irony
will be repeated in the revised PAM?
Not least is this possibly the case because, as mentioned, speculative traders themselves—
particularly when exhibiting irrational herd behavior—often unduly influence the price of the
derivative’s underlying issue. The market response to the second Shuttle disaster is an example of
this. One can also adduce as evidence the role of herd mentality on expectation and uncertainty in
currency markets, where, for example, in 1998 a series of wild rumors about the weakness of the
fundamentally sound Thai baht led speculative currency traders into herd behavior that destroyed
that nation’s currency and economy, leading to a massive IMF bailout. Thus, for example, in the
case of the revamped PAM it is still possible that the market rumor mill Keynes described could
effect the value of underlying issues like oil or investment; and it is by no means certain that, say,
one of these herd speculation induced rapid and undue drops or rises in the price of oil or some
other basic commodity will have a non-descript impact on the political economy of these M.E.
nations. With PAM, which is a speculative market, the result of such herd behavior, to which
derivatives traders are particularly prone, could be wrecked sectors of M.E. economies and terrorist
activity.
In its original version the system’s default setting, its normal equilibrium, is a crisis manifesting as
a doubled auto-inadequation. At the risk of unnecessary conflation, one can think this aspect of
systematicity along the lines of George Bataille’s understanding of a “general economy.” For
Bataille, the moments of a general economy have not arrived at the governing mechanism of the
whole; rather, in the very act of attempting to fix its members, the system generates the
impossibility of doing so. As he claims in La Part Maudite, a general economy is “by definition,
this movement, the effect of which is prodigality,” which “is far from being equal to itself.”55
Indeed, PAM’s instability makes it a good candidate for exhibiting the features of a general
economy. Its conceptual ideal is not adequate to its reality, in two ways. Its logical flaws prevent it
from getting off the ground, and thus it does to little—and even if those flaws were solved the
system still has the distinct possibility of doing too much, of producing the problem it is meant to
solve. Conceptually, buying terrorism futures was to be buying security; reality happens when
terrorism futures, designed to ensure security, do nothing more than secure the future of terrorism.
The system’s conceptual basis, the cunning of reason, is a philosophically venerable one—and also
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very fickle. As such, the role of unintended consequences upon which the market is based can recoil
badly, can produce results dialectically opposed to one’s wishes.
1) Conclusion and Historical Considerations: I am sympathetic with the impetus behind PAM, as it
is essentially an attempt to understand terrorism, whose possible range of definition has become
narrowed in breadth and depth. Furthermore, it marks another attempt to shift the basis of markets
from their historical position of being rather mute with regard to telling us about ourselves and
about the future. But as with all evolution and paradigm changes of technological entities, results
must be analyzed, lest the promise of a better tomorrow come with the reality of an unnecessary
increase in destruction today. As Nietzsche once quipped, one can often experience “how much
blood and horror lies at the basis of all ‘good things’!”56 Provided one’s reasons are sound,
advocating against a new technology is by no means simply a reactionary Ludditism. In this case,
both the original and revised versions of PAM warrant distrust as technologies.
Mason Richey
State University of New York at Binghamton
DAAD Fellow, Berlin
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purchase is to produce profit. Furthermore, supply-demand logic always stipulates that the purchase
of a security or derivative lowers supply, thus indicating rising demand and the expectation of a rise
in price (leading to profit).
40. This is an adaptation of the critique of the normative, ideal, “frictionless” market theory
assumed by neo-classical economics. For a good explanation of this: Colin Leys, Market-Driven
Politics: Neoliberal Democracy and the Public Interest (London: Verso, 2001), 81-83. (Henceforth:
MDP)
41. I.e. the contradiction I analyzed first, paradoxically, cannot even really exist because it is
preceded by the contradiction listed second. I will elucidate this more.
42. Unfortunately, I cannot go into the specifics of this.
43. Which is the actual moment2 masking itself the first moment.
44. One notices that the market’s effective demand is always retroactively constituted.
45. GT (Ch. 12).
46. Gross, August 8, 2003.
47. Ibid.
48. As a further claim for PAM’s self-undermining vis-à-vis terrorism prevention, it may also be
the case that this irrational price fluctuation could inhibit conventional counter-terrorism and
intelligence projects already established.
49. Just recently, witness: Enron, MCI Worldcom, Tyco, HealthSouth, Arthur Anderson, the SEC’s
penalties for several large investment banks and mutual funds, Martha Stewart, Sam Waksal, etc.
50. For those who do not think governments perpetrate such activities: read Machiavelli, listen to
the Nixon tapes, listen to the tapes of MacNamara and Johnson fabricating the attacks in the Gulf of
Tonkin, etc. Geopolitics, Realpolitik in general, is by definition no respecter of ethics.
51. I hasten to note that it may well be the case that the moral outcry had little causality in the
Pentagon’s decision to scrap PAM in its configuration at that time. It may well simply be the case
that one of their staff economists or policy writers figured out the same problems presented in this
paper.
52. Policy Analysis Market November 2003, http://www.policyanalysismarket.com.
53. The basic strategy for using this price discovery mechanism is the same as when the contracts
also include terrorist events and the like, only in this second version the counter-terrorism analysts
would have to judge the likelihood of the event from secondary indicators (e.g. a rapid drop in oil
profits, trade, and foreign direct investment in a nation might indicate a likely terrorist event).
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54. Martin Weitzman, “Profit-sharing Capitalism,” in Alternatives to Capitalism, ed. John Elster
and K.O. Moene (Paris: Cambridge University Press, 1993) p. 62.
55. Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share, Trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Zone Books, 1991).
56. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality (1887), trans. Carol Diethe (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 42. I owe these observations to an article by Jason Wirth,
“Exhilarated Despair and Optimism in Nothing,” in International Studies in Philosophy, 31, 1
(Winter 1999): 131-132.
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